Showing posts with label torts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label torts. Show all posts
Thursday, October 27, 2011
Palsgraf in Legos
I've mentioned Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. before. A couple of days ago, one of my classmates clued a few of us into a lego re-enactment of the case (some details modified to update the case for our time). Go watch it. In my book, it's up there with the RBI Baseball re-enactment of Game Six.
Thursday, October 13, 2011
Tyler Durden on Medical Malpractice
We seem to be on a roll with Torts cases this week.
Earlier in the week, we looked at Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, a relatively recent medical malpractice case from Massachusetts. Matsuyama was the sort of person who could be at risk for stomach cancer. He had a history of smoking, and he'd spent twenty-four years living in Korea and Japan, countries where the risk of stomach cancer is recognized [see Ikiru...even if you don't care about stomach cancer, watch the film. It might just change your life] and where endoscopies have been recommended to men of my age as part of a physical.
Anyways, Matsuyama changed primary care providers in 1995. That July, he went in for a physical examination, and he complained of "heartburn and difficulty breathing associated with eating and lifting." He was misdiagnosed with gastrointestinal reflux disease, and tests associated with cancer weren't run for several years, in which time he made multiple visits. The cancer wasn't discovered until May 1999, when it was too late. By October, Matsuyama was dead.
The jury found that the doctor had been negligent in not initially diagnosing Matsuyama with stage two gastric cancer. While Matsuyama's chance of living with a proper diagnosis was less than 50%, he still lost something real, and of value. He lost a 37.5% chance of survival, which dropped to 0 after his disease went untreated.
They awarded his estate full wrongful death damages, which were multiplied by his chance of survival to arrive at "loss of chance" damages, which were added to damages awarded for painful suffering. The court went on to explain the loss of chance doctrine, which is generally seen as preferable to the traditional principles of providing compensation when the plaintiff was deprived of more than a 50% chance of recovery. This modified approach allows for something to be recovered when something of value has been lost: in this case, it was a 3 of 8 shot at living.
Compared to the traditional approaches, this modified approach seems fair, since it allows for compensation proportionate to the loss, providing a middle ground for both plaintiff and defendant. I'm also glad that this case was decided outside of the jurisdiction of one Tyler Durden, who would likely have taken a less favorable view of things. What would Judge Durden say?
"On a long enough timeline, everyone's survival rate drops to zero."
Earlier in the week, we looked at Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, a relatively recent medical malpractice case from Massachusetts. Matsuyama was the sort of person who could be at risk for stomach cancer. He had a history of smoking, and he'd spent twenty-four years living in Korea and Japan, countries where the risk of stomach cancer is recognized [see Ikiru...even if you don't care about stomach cancer, watch the film. It might just change your life] and where endoscopies have been recommended to men of my age as part of a physical.
Anyways, Matsuyama changed primary care providers in 1995. That July, he went in for a physical examination, and he complained of "heartburn and difficulty breathing associated with eating and lifting." He was misdiagnosed with gastrointestinal reflux disease, and tests associated with cancer weren't run for several years, in which time he made multiple visits. The cancer wasn't discovered until May 1999, when it was too late. By October, Matsuyama was dead.
The jury found that the doctor had been negligent in not initially diagnosing Matsuyama with stage two gastric cancer. While Matsuyama's chance of living with a proper diagnosis was less than 50%, he still lost something real, and of value. He lost a 37.5% chance of survival, which dropped to 0 after his disease went untreated.
They awarded his estate full wrongful death damages, which were multiplied by his chance of survival to arrive at "loss of chance" damages, which were added to damages awarded for painful suffering. The court went on to explain the loss of chance doctrine, which is generally seen as preferable to the traditional principles of providing compensation when the plaintiff was deprived of more than a 50% chance of recovery. This modified approach allows for something to be recovered when something of value has been lost: in this case, it was a 3 of 8 shot at living.
Compared to the traditional approaches, this modified approach seems fair, since it allows for compensation proportionate to the loss, providing a middle ground for both plaintiff and defendant. I'm also glad that this case was decided outside of the jurisdiction of one Tyler Durden, who would likely have taken a less favorable view of things. What would Judge Durden say?
"On a long enough timeline, everyone's survival rate drops to zero."
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
Following up with Palsgraf
The answer to yesterday's question was "danger zone." Thank you, Top Gun, for embedding that phrase into my head. Turns out that's a technical term in tort law.
In Palsgraf, a man ran to catch a train that was already in motion (insert several iconic scenes and dozens of cliched scenes here), and jumped onboard. He seemed like he was about to fall, so two guards reached out to steady him. In the process, the package he was carrying, which was covered in newspaper, fell onto the rails below.
That package contained fireworks, although nothing about the packaging indicated as much. Fireworks, as they are prone to do, exploded, and some scales on the other end of the railroad platform fell, injuring the plaintiff who was standing on the platform.
The issue: did the railroad company have a duty to protect the plaintiff from this sort of an occurence?
The court said they didn't, because it was outside of the foreseeable zone of risk, in other words, the danger zone. The guards had no way of knowing that the package contained fireworks, or that it would explode upon impact with the ground, causing the sort of harm that was caused. So there wasn't a case against them.
In Palsgraf, a man ran to catch a train that was already in motion (insert several iconic scenes and dozens of cliched scenes here), and jumped onboard. He seemed like he was about to fall, so two guards reached out to steady him. In the process, the package he was carrying, which was covered in newspaper, fell onto the rails below.
That package contained fireworks, although nothing about the packaging indicated as much. Fireworks, as they are prone to do, exploded, and some scales on the other end of the railroad platform fell, injuring the plaintiff who was standing on the platform.
The issue: did the railroad company have a duty to protect the plaintiff from this sort of an occurence?
The court said they didn't, because it was outside of the foreseeable zone of risk, in other words, the danger zone. The guards had no way of knowing that the package contained fireworks, or that it would explode upon impact with the ground, causing the sort of harm that was caused. So there wasn't a case against them.
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Gametime: What caught my eye?
A passage from today's Torts reading (Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 162 N.E. 99.)
"The proposition is this. Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain. We have never, I think, held otherwise."
Take a guess as to what phrase held my attention, then check your comprehension. [If you lived with me during my first two years of college, you can probably guess.]
"The proposition is this. Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain. We have never, I think, held otherwise."
Take a guess as to what phrase held my attention, then check your comprehension. [If you lived with me during my first two years of college, you can probably guess.]
Monday, September 26, 2011
Danger: Falling Barrels
Coming up in Torts this week: the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. That latin term means "the thing speaks for itself," and it has to do with the use of circumstantial evidence to prove negligence.
The classic formulation of the doctrine comes from Byrne v. Boadle, a 19th century British case (150 Eng. Rep. 299). The plaintiff was walking down a public street when a barrel of flour fell from a window, hit him, and injured him. How much does he have to prove, and how much evidence does he need to provide that the owner of the flour shop is responsible for this?
According to the judge, this is one of those cases where the thing does speak for itself. In the words of the Chief Baron, "It is the duty of persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll out, and I think that such a case would, beyond all doubt, afford prima facie evidence of negligence. A barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some negligence, and to say that a plaintiff who is injured by it must call witnesses from the warehouse to prove negligence seems to me preposterous."
So in a case like this, the defendant has to prove that the barrel fell for reasons other than negligence. The thing speaks for itself, at least unless compelling evidence is introduced to suggest otherwise. And it's the defendant's job to produce that evidence and provide an alternate cause.
What would qualify as an alternate cause? Well, it is possible that a group of performance artists took over the side of the building and decided to bring Donkey Kong to life. In the middle of the game, an errant barrel came down and struck the plaintiff as he passed by. What would proving this require? Well, I imagine that you'd start with testimony establishing that someone dressed like a giant ape was perched atop the building, and that a mustachioed plumber was seen hopping from fire escape to fire escape at the time in question.
While this probably wouldn't have happened back in the 1860s, it's at least conceivable today.
The classic formulation of the doctrine comes from Byrne v. Boadle, a 19th century British case (150 Eng. Rep. 299). The plaintiff was walking down a public street when a barrel of flour fell from a window, hit him, and injured him. How much does he have to prove, and how much evidence does he need to provide that the owner of the flour shop is responsible for this?
According to the judge, this is one of those cases where the thing does speak for itself. In the words of the Chief Baron, "It is the duty of persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll out, and I think that such a case would, beyond all doubt, afford prima facie evidence of negligence. A barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some negligence, and to say that a plaintiff who is injured by it must call witnesses from the warehouse to prove negligence seems to me preposterous."
So in a case like this, the defendant has to prove that the barrel fell for reasons other than negligence. The thing speaks for itself, at least unless compelling evidence is introduced to suggest otherwise. And it's the defendant's job to produce that evidence and provide an alternate cause.
What would qualify as an alternate cause? Well, it is possible that a group of performance artists took over the side of the building and decided to bring Donkey Kong to life. In the middle of the game, an errant barrel came down and struck the plaintiff as he passed by. What would proving this require? Well, I imagine that you'd start with testimony establishing that someone dressed like a giant ape was perched atop the building, and that a mustachioed plumber was seen hopping from fire escape to fire escape at the time in question.
While this probably wouldn't have happened back in the 1860s, it's at least conceivable today.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)